In many industries, the importance of software components provided by third-party suppliers is steadily increasing. As the suppliers seek to secure their intellectual property (IP) rights, the customer usually has no direct access to the suppliers' source code, and is able to enforce the use of verification tools only by legal requirements. In turn, the supplier has no means to convince the customer about successful verification without revealing the source code. This article presents an approach to resolve the conflict between the IP interests of the supplier and the quality interests of the customer. We introduce a protocol in which a dedicated server (called the "amanat") is controlled by both parties: the customer controls the verification task performed by the amanat, while the supplier controls the communication channels of the amanat to ensure that the amanat does not leak information about the source code. We argue that the protocol is both practically useful and mathematically sound. As the protocol is based on well-known (and relatively lightweight) cryptographic primitives, it allows a straightforward implementation on top of existing verification tool chains. To substantiate our security claims, we establish the correctness of the protocol by cryptographic reduction proofs.
INTRODUCTION
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Industrial production of software-intensive technology however often employs supply chains which render this simple scenario obsolete. Complex products are being increasingly assembled from multiple components whose development is outsourced to supplying companies. Typical examples of outsourced software components comprise embedded controller software [Broy 2006; Heinecke 2004] and Windows device drivers [Ball et al. 2004] . Although the suppliers may use verification techniques for internal use, they are usually not willing to reveal their source code, as the intellectual property (IP) contained in the source code is a major asset.
This setting constitutes a principal conflict between the supplier Sup who owns the source code, and the customer Cus who purchases only the executable. While both parties share a basic interest in producing high quality software, it is in the customer's interest to have the source code inspected, and in the supplier's interest to protect the source code. More formally, this amounts to the following basic requirements:
(a) Conformance. The customer must be able to validate that the purchased executable was compiled from successfully verified source code. (b) Secrecy. The supplier must be able to ensure that no information about the source code besides the verification result is revealed to the customer.
The main technical contribution of this paper is a new cryptographic verification protocol tailored for IP-aware verification. Our protocol is based on standard cryptographic primitives, and satisfies both requirements with little overhead in the system configuration. Notably, the proposed scheme applies not only to automated verification in a model checking style, but also supports a wide range of validation techniques, both automated and semi-manual.
Our solution centers around the notion of an amanat. This terminology is derived from the historic judicial notion of amanats, that is, noble prisoners who were kept hostage as part of a contract. Intuitively, our protocol applies a similar principle: The amanat is a trusted expert of the customer who settles down in the production plant of the supplier and executes whatever verification job the customer has entrusted on him. The supplier accepts this procedure because (i) all of the amanat's communications are subject to the censorship of the supplier, and, (ii) the amanat will never leave the supplier again.
It is evident that clauses (i) and (ii) make it quite infeasible to find human amanats; instead, our protocol utilizes a dedicated server Ama for this task. The protocol guarantees that Ama is simultaneously controlled by both parties: Cus controls the verification task performed by Ama, while Sup controls the communication channels of Ama. To convince Cus about conformance, Ama produces a cryptographic certificate that proves that the purchased executable has been derived by the amanat from the same source code as the verification verdict.
To achieve this goal, we employ public key cryptography; the amanat uses the secret private key of the customer, and signs outgoing information with this secret key such that no additional information can be hidden in the signature. This enables the supplier to inspect (and possibly block) all outgoing information, and simultaneously enables the customer to validate that the certificate indeed stems from the amanat. Hence, the protocol satisfies clauses (i) and (ii). Figure 1 presents a high-level illustration of the protocol: If the code supplier Sup and the customer Cus utilize the amanat protocol, they first install an amanat server Ama such that (a) Cus is assured that Sup is unable to tamper with the amanat, and (b) Sup gains complete control over the communication link between Ama and Cus. The customer Cus equips Ama with a public/private key pair, such that Ama can authenticate its messages to be delivered to Cus. While the public key is handed to Sup, the private key is kept secret from Sup. Then, once provided with the tools Compiler and Verifier, Ama is ready to compute certified verification verdicts: Sup assembles the sources source and sends them to Ama. Ama runs Verifier to obtain the outputs log Sup and log Cus , dedicated to Sup and Cus, respectively: log Sup may contain IP-critical but development-relevant information, while log Cus is only allowed to contain the verification verdict. Parallel to the verification, Ama uses Compiler to compile the binary exec. Using its private key, Ama computes a certificate cert which authenticates exec together with log Cus as being computed from the same source. All these results are returned to Sup. Then, Sup checks whether all computations have been performed as expected, that is, whether exec and log Cus resulted from respective invocations of Compiler and Verifier, and whether cert has been computed properly. Since the computation of cert involves random bits, the amanat protocol allows Sup to check that Ama chose these random bits before accessing source-such that they cannot contain any information on source. If these checks succeed, Sup is assured that the secrecy of its IP has been preserved. After evaluating log Sup and log Cus regarding its content, Sup decides whether to forward exec, log Cus , and cert to Cus across the IP boundary or not. If the results are forwarded to Cus, cert is checked by Cus and if the certificate is valid, Cus accepts exec and log Cus as being conformant.
Verification by Model Checking and Beyond. Motivated by discussions with industrial collaborators, we primarily intended our protocol to facilitate software model checking across IP boundaries in a B2B setting where suppliers and customers are businesses. Our guiding examples for this setting have been Windows device drivers and automotive controller software, for which our protocols are practically feasible with state-of-the-art technology. Software model checking is now able to verify important properties of simply structured code [Ball and Rajamani 2001; Chaki et al. 2003; Clarke et al. 2004; Cook et al. 2006; Gotsman et al. 2006; Henzinger et al. 2002; Podelski and Rybalchenko 2007] .
At the same time, intensive software development have conquered traditional industries which rely on deep supply chains, such as the automotive industries: A number of initiatives have been started to establish standardized and industry-wide accepted computing environments, most notably AUTOSAR [2007] , OSEK [ ], or JASPAR [2007 . These standardization efforts originate in the need to integrate software components developed by various companies along a deep supply chain, demanding a component-wise verification in presence of heavy IP interests [Pretschner et al. 2007 ].
The amanat protocol provides a general framework to perform source-dependent validation tasks in presence of IP boundaries and is therefore not restricted to pure verification: For example, it may be necessary for customers and suppliers to communicate some software design details without revealing the underlying source code. In this case, the supplier can decide to reveal a blueprint of the software, and the amanat can certify the accuracy of the blueprint by a mutually agreed algorithm. This is possible, because the amanat can run any verification/validation tool whose output does not compromise the secrecy of the source code, including, for example, static analysis tools such as ASTREE [Cousot et al. 2005] or TVLA [Sagiv et al. 2002] , or theorem provers for checking correctness proofs, such as PVS, ISABELLE, Coq or any other prover [Wiedijk 2006 ].
We note that in all these scenarios the code supplier bears the burden of proof: Ama is provided with source and must be able to verify with Verifier alone that source and the resulting binary exec are satisfying the specified requirements. To this end, source may contain auxiliary information supporting Verifier in computing the verification verdict, for example, a proof to be verfied by a theorem prover to show the conformance of source with its specification. However, this auxiliary information must not influence the verdict but only help computing it.
Security of the Amanat Protocol. We discuss in Section 4 the secrecy and conformance of the amanat verification protocol. Stronger than term-based proofs in the Dolev-Yao model [Dolev and Yao 1981] , the security properties of the protocol assure that under standard cryptographic assumptions, randomized polynomial time attacks against the protocol (involving, e.g., guessing the private keys) can succeed only with negligible probability.
The cryptographic protocols require Cus and Ama to share a secret unknown to Sup, namely the private key of the customer; this secret enables Ama to authenticate its verdict to Cus and by computing the certificate. Consequently, we need to assure a physical system configuration where Ama can neither be reverse-engineered, nor closely monitored by the supplier. On the other hand, from the point of view of Sup, Ama is an untrusted black box, and thus Sup requires ownership of Ama to ensure it will never return to the customer. Hence, Ama is physically located at the supplier, but in a sealed location or box whose integrity is assured through, for example, regular checks by the customer, a third party, or sealed hardware [Ravi et al. 2004 ]. All communication channels of Ama are hardwired to the communication filter of Sup. In B2B settings, such a scenario is practically feasible, as it only requires that the seal is checked after verification and before deployment.
The supplier has total control over the information leaving the production site, and can read, delay, drop, and modify all outgoing messages-which is a convincing and easy to explain argument that no sensitive information is leaking. In our opinion, this simplicity of the amanat protocol is a major advantage for practical application.
Organization of the Article. In Section 2, we survey related work and discuss alternative approaches to the amanat protocol. Afterwards in Section 3, we introduce the relevant tools and cryptographic primitives, followed by a brief protocol overview, and a detailed description of the protocol. The secrecy and conformance of the protocol are discussed in Section 4, and the article conclude with Section 5.
RELATED WORK AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
The last few years have seen renewed activity in the analysis of executables from the verification and programming languages community. Despite remarkable advances (see, e.g., [Balakrishnan and Reps 2007; Cifuentes and Fraboulet 1997; Debray et al. 1999; Kinder and Veith 2010; Reps et al. 2005] ), the computer-aided analysis of executables remains a hard problem. Although dynamic analysis [Colin and Mariani 2005] and approaches dealing with black box systems Yannakakis 1994, 1996; Peled et al. 1999] are relatively immune to obfuscation, they are limited either in the range of systems they can deal with or in the correctness properties they can assure.
The current article is orthogonal to executable analysis. We consider a scenario where the software author is willing to assert the quality of the source code by formal methods, but does not or provide the source code to the customer.
While proof-Carrying Code [Necula 1997 ] is able to generate certificates for binaries, it is only applicable for a restricted class of safety policies. More importantly, a proof for nontrivial system properties will explain-for all practical purposes-the internal logic of the binary, and thus, publishing this proof is tantamount to losing intellectual property.
The current article takes an engineer's view on computer security, as it exploits the conceptual difference between source code and executable. While we are aware of advanced methods such as secure multiparty computation [Goldreich 2002 ] and zeroknowledge proofs [Ben-Or et al. 1988 ], we believe that they are impracticable for our problem, as such methods cannot be easily wrapped over given validation tools. Finally, we believe that any advanced method without an intuitive proof for its secrecy will be heavily opposed by the supplier-and might therefore be hard to establish in practice. Thus, we are convinced that the conceptual simplicity of our protocol is an asset for practical applicability.
THE AMANAT PROTOCOL
The amanat protocol resolves the conflict between the customer Cus who wants to verify the source code, and the supplier Sup who needs to protect its IP. To this end, the amanat Ama computes a certificate which contains a verdict on the program correctness, but does not reveal any information beyond the verdict itself.
Requirements and Tool Landscape
We fix some notation and assumptions about the tool landscape. Our tools are restricted to run in deterministic polynomial time, however, to deal with higher runtime complexities, we pad source, that is, add a string long enough to upper-bound the runtime of all tools with a polynomial in the padded length of source. By adding random seeds to source, we can also integrate randomized tools into our framework.
Definition 3.1 (Compiler). The compiler Compiler translates an input source into an executable exec = Compiler(source) in deterministic polynomial time.
Note that Compiler does not take any further input. In practice, this means that source is a directory tree and that Compiler is a tool chain composed of compiler, linker etc.
Definition 3.2 (Verification Tool). The verification tool Verifier takes the input source and computes in deterministic polynomial time two verification verdicts, log Sup and log Cus , that is, log Sup , log Cus = Verifier(source).
Here, log Sup is a detailed verdict for the supplier possibly containing IP-critical information such as counterexamples or witnesses for certain properties. The second output log Cus in contrast contains only uncritical verification verdicts that Sup and Cus have agreed upon beforehand. Similar as for the compiler, we assume that Verifier does not take any inputs besides source. Hence, source contains auxiliary information, such as command line parameters, and the specification to be checked-allowing Ama to output the verification results together with their specifications into log Cus to be delivered to Cus.
As in the case of Compiler, Verifier is not restricted to consist of a single tool. On the contrary, Verifier can comprise a whole set of verification tools, as long as they are tied together to produce a single pair log Sup , log Cus of combined outputs.
Having fixed environment and notation, we paraphrase the requirements in a more precise manner: The goal of the Amanat protocol is to give mathematical guarantees for these two properties for all (but a negligible fraction) of protocol executions-based on two assumptions: First, the communication channels between Sup, Cus, and Ama must be secure, that is, the protocol is not designed to cope with orthogonal risks such as eavesdropping or malicious manipulations on these channels. Second, we assume that all ingoing and outgoing information for Ama is controlled by Sup, that is, Sup can manipulate all data exchanged between Ama and Cus.
Cryptographic Primitives
Before we formally describe the primitives for encrypting, decrypting, signing and verifying messages, we note that the underlying algorithms are not deterministic but randomized. This randomization is a countermeasure to attacks against naive implementations of RSA and other schemes which exploit algebraically related messages, see, for example, Dolev et al. [2000] . In many protocols, the randomization can be treated as technical detail, as each participant can locally generate random values. But in our protocol, we must ensure that the signatures generated by Ama do not contain hidden information for Cus-and must hence deal with randomization explicitly: Using methods from steganography [Petitcolas and Katzenbeisser 2000] , Ama could encode source code properties into allegedly randomly generated bits. To preclude this possibility, our protocol forces Ama to commit its random bits before it sees the source code.
Here, we define schemes for encrypting and signing messages. In case of the signature scheme, we also add procedures with explicit randomization parameters. As both schemes use an asymmetric key-pair, we assume that the same pair k priv , k pub is applicable for both.
Definition 3.5 (Public-Key Encryption Scheme). Given a key pair k priv , k pub , we define the encryption and decryption and their respectively required computational complexity bound (with respect to length of their inputs and security parameters) as follows: Definition 3.6 (Public-Key Signature Scheme). Given a key pair k priv , k pub , we define the following operations running in deterministic polynomial time (with respect to length of their inputs and the security parameter):
-Signature Generation. We write s = csign(k priv , m, R) for the signature s of a message m signed with key k priv and generated with random seed R. -Signature Verification. cverify(k pub , m, s) denotes the verification result of a signature s for message m with key k priv . The verification succeeds, iff there exists a random seed R such that s = csign(k priv , m, R) holds. -Random Seed Extraction. We write R = cextract(s) for s = csign(k priv , m, R) to extract the random seed R used in a signature s generated for message m with key k priv . -Signature Verification with Fixed Random Seed. We write cverify(k pub , m, s, R) to check whether a signature s for message m and k priv has been generated with random seed R, that is, cverify(k pub , m, s, R) succeeds iff s = csign(k priv , m, R) holds.
Thus, besides standard signature generation and verification with csign(k priv , m, R) and cverify(k pub , m, s), respectively, we require the existence of two additional procedures: The first one, cextract(s) extracts the random seed R used in signature s, and the second one, cverify(k pub , m, s, R) verifies that signature s has been generated with seed R.
Aside providing these interfaces, suitable cryptographic primitives must satisfy the relevant security properties (see Theorem 4.2): In case of the encryption scheme, our requirements are fairly standard and are satisfied by a number of encryption schemes, for example, one can use ElGamal encryption [ElGamal 1985] . For the signature scheme, we propose to use [Cramer and Shoup 2000] which is based upon RSA [Rivest et al. 1978] and SHA [NIST 1995] and allows to implement all operations described here.
Summary Description of the Protocol
Our protocol is based on the principle that Cus trusts Ama, and thus, Cus believes that a verification verdict log Cus originating from Ama is conformant with a corresponding binary exec. Therefore, Cus and Sup install Ama at Sup's site such that Sup can use Ama to generate trusted verification verdicts subsequently. At the same time, Sup controls all the communication to and from Ama, and consequently Sup is able to prohibit the communication of any piece of information beyond the verification verdict, that is, Sup can enforce the secrecy of its IP. To ensure that Sup does not alter the verdict of Ama, Ama signs the verdicts with a key which is only known to Ama and Cus but not to Sup. Also, to ensure that the tools Compiler and Verifier given to Ama are untampered, Sup must provide certificates that guarantee that these tools have been approved by Cus.
A protocol based on this simple idea does ensure the conformance property, but a naive implementation with common cryptographic primitives fails to guarantee secrecy: As argued previously, the certificates generated by Ama involve random seeds, and Sup cannot check these random seeds for hidden information. In our protocol, to prohibit such hidden transmission of information, Ama is not allowed to generate the required random seeds after it has accessed source. Instead, Ama generates a large supply of random seeds before it has access to source, and sends them to Sup. In this way, Ama commits to the random seeds. Later, Sup checks that Ama used exactly these random values. Thus, Ama is not able to encode any information about source into these seeds.
The only remaining problem is that Sup is not allowed to know the random seeds in advance, since it could use this knowledge to compromise the cryptographic security of the certificates computed by Ama. Therefore, Ama encrypts each random seed with a specific key before transmitting them to Sup, and reveals the corresponding key when it uses one of its seeds.
Detailed Protocol Description
Our protocol consists of three phases, namely, the installation, session initialization, and certification. Installation Phase. After Ama is initialized and installing at the designated site, all communication between Ama and Cus is controlled by Sup.
I1 Master Key Generation
[ Cus ] Cus generates the master keys km priv , km pub and initializes Ama with them. I2 Installation of the Amanat [ Sup, Cus ] Ama is installed at Sup's site and Sup receives km pub .
Session Initialization Phase. Once Sup and Cus must agree on a specific Verifier and Compiler, the session initialization phase starts: Cus generates a session key pair, sends it in an encrypted manner to Ama via Sup (S1), and Verifier and Compiler are certified and handed to Ama (S2-5). Next, Ama generates a supply of random seeds R 1 , . . . , R t for t subsequent executions of the certification phase, along with corresponding key pairs kr t priv , kr t pub . Ama encrypts each random seed and sends kr i pub (R i ) to Sup. Ama and Sup both maintain a variable round which is initialized to 0 and incremented by 1 for each execution of the certification phase (S6).
S1 Session Key Generation
[ Cus, Sup ] Cus generates the session keys ks priv , ks pub and sends km pub (ks priv ) and ks pub to Sup. Sup forwards km pub (ks priv ) and ks pub unchanged to Ama.
S2 Generation of the Tool Certificates
[ Cus ] Cus computes the certificates cert Verifier = csign(ks priv , Verifier) and cert Compiler = csign(ks priv , Compiler). Cus sends both certificates to Sup.
S3 Supplier Validation of the Tool Certificates
[ Sup ] Sup checks the contents of the certificates, that is, Sup checks that cverify(ks pub , Verifier, cert Verifier ) and cverify(ks pub , Compiler, cert Compiler ) succeed. If one of the checks fails, Sup aborts the protocol.
S4 Amanat Tool Transmission
[ Sup ] Sup sends Verifier, Compiler, and the certificates cert Verifier and cert Compiler to Ama.
S5 Amanat Validation of the Tool Certificates
[ Ama ] Ama checks whether Verifier and Compiler are properly certified, that is, it checks whether cverify(ks pub , Verifier, cert Verifier ) and cverify(ks pub , Compiler, cert Compiler ) succeed. If this check fails, Ama refuses to process any further input. S6 Amanat Random Seed Generation
[ Ama ] Ama generates -a series of random seeds R 1 , . . . , R t together with a series of corresponding key pairs kr 1 priv , kr 1 pub , . . . , kr t priv , kr t pub ,
-encrypts random seeds with the corresponding keys kr i pub (R i ) for i = 1, . . . , t, and -initializes round counter round = 0. Ama sends kr i pub (R i ) and kr i pub for i = 1, . . . , t to Sup.
Certification Phase. Ama is now ready for the certification phase, that is, it will accept source to produce a certified verdict on source, which can be forwarded to Cus and whose trustworthy origin can be checked by Cus. For certification, Ama runs Verifier and Compiler on source and generates a certificate cert for the binary exec and the verification output log Cus dedicated to Cus, all based on the random seed R round (C1-2). Upon receiving the certification results along with the key kr round priv , Sup reconstructs the random seed R round = kr round priv (kr pub (R round )) which Ama supposedly used for the generation of the certificate. Then, if the certificate is valid and based upon R round -and if the validation verdict is good enough-Sup forwards the certified results to Cus (C3). In turn, Cus checks that the certificate is valid and evaluates the validation verdict (C4).
C1 Source Code Transmission
[ Sup ] Sup sends source to Ama.
C2 Source Code Verification by the Amanat
[ Ama ] Ama computes -the verdict log Sup , log Cus = Verifier(source) of Verifier on source, -the binary exec = Compiler(source), -increments the round counter round, and cert = csign(ks priv , exec, log Cus , R round ). Ama sends exec, log Sup , log Cus , cert, and kr round priv to Sup.
C3 Secrecy Validation
[ Sup ] Upon receiving exec, log Sup , log Cus , cert, and kr round priv , Sup -decrypts the random seed with R round = kr round priv (kr round pub (R round )), -checks whether exec = Compiler(source) and log Sup , log Cus = Verifier(source) hold, and -verifies that cverify(ks pub , exec, log Cus , cert, R round ) succeeds. If the checks fails, Sup concludes that the secrecy requirement has been violated, and refuses to proceed with the protocol. Otherwise, Sup evaluates log Cus and log Sup and decides whether to deliver exec, log Cus , and cert to Cus in step C4 or whether to abort the protocol.
C4 Conformance Validation
[ Cus ] Having received exec, log Cus , and cert, Cus verifies that certificate is valid, that is, that cverify(ks pub , exec, log Cus , cert) succeeds. If the checks fails, Cus concludes that the conformance requirement has been violated, and refuses to proceed with the protocol. Otherwise, Cus evaluates the contents of log Cus and decides whether the verification verdict supports the purchase of the product exec.
PROTOCOL SECURITY
We designed the amanat protocol aiming at a simple and intuitive argument for its secrecy. Such a straightforward proof is a prerequisite to convince a code supplying company that the protocol keeps their highly valued IP assets safe.
The idea behind this proof is straightforward and does not rely on cryptographic assumptions: As the certificate cert is the only place to transmit additional information from Ama to Cus, we make sure that cert can be computed without knowing the source itself. Hence, no information on the source can be possibly hidden in cert.
THEOREM 4.1 (SECRECY). The amanat protocol enforces secrecy (see Definition 3.4) in all its executions unconditionally.
More specifically, Cus is unable to extract any piece of information on the source source which is not contained in exec and log Cus , because the certificate is entirely determined by source and a pre-committed random seed.
We state the conformance of our protocol using standard cryptographic assumptions: Following Goldreich [2004] , we assume that the public-key encryption is semantically secure and that the signature scheme is secure against adaptive chosen message attacks, such as the RSA-based scheme proposed in Cramer and Shoup [2000] . THEOREM 4.2 (CONFORMANCE). The conformance property holds in all but a negligible fraction of the accepting protocol executions, under the assumption that (a) the underlying encryption is semantically secure [Goldreich 2004 ], (b) the signature scheme is secure against adaptively chosen message attacks [Cramer and Shoup 2000] , and (c) the supplier Sup runs in probabilistic polynomial time.
Proofs for both theorems can be found in Chaki et al. [2007b] .
CONCLUSION
IP boundaries impose an obstacle for the dissemination and application of verification techniques. In the common research scenarios on verfication, a relationship of mutual trust between the software author and the verification engineer is assumed: First, the verification engineer believes that the sources provided by the author have yielded the final binary, and second, the author expects the engineer to respect its IP rights on the provided sources. But in an industrial context, a mutual trust relationship is insufficient as protection against misconduct. We identified two security properties which facilitate verification across IP boundaries: First, conformance requires that the verification verdict and the delivered binary are produced from the same source, and second, secrecy requires that the customer does not learn anything about the sources except for the information in the binary and the verdict.
Taking the need for conformance and secrecy as starting point, we introduce the amanat protocol to satisfy both requirements: The amanat protocol guarantees secrecy unconditionally and conformance based on commonly relied-upon security assumptions.
